Includes bibliography(p. 491 - 566) and notes

Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 1*. Preference Relations
Chapter 2. Unanimity
Chapter 2*. Collective Choice Rules and Pareto Comparisons
Chapter 3. Collective Rationality Chapter 3*. Social Welfare Functions
Chapter 4. Choice Versus Orderings Chapter 4*. Social Decision Functions
Chapter 5. Values and Choice
Chapter 5*. Anonymity, Neutrality and Responsiveness
Chapter 6. Conflicts and Dilemmas
Chapter 6*. The Liberal Paradox
Chapter 7. Interpersonal Aggregation and Comparability
Chapter 7*. Aggregation Quasi-Orderings
Chapter 8. Cardinality With or Without Comparability Chapter 8*. Bargains and Social Welfare Functions
Chapter 9. Equity and Justice Chapter 9*. Impersonality and Collective Quasi-Orderings
Chapter 10. Majority Choice and Related Systems Chapter 10*. Restricted Preferences and Rational Choice
Chapter 11. Theory and Practice Collective Choice and Social Welfare (2017)
Chapter A1. Enlightenment and Impossibility Chapter A1*. Social Preference Chapter A2. Rationality and Consistency Chapter A2*. Problems of Social Choice Chapter A3 Justice and Equity Chapter A3*. Social Welfare Evaluation Chapter A4. Democracy and Public Engagement Chapter A4*. Votes and Majorities Chapter A5. The Idea of Rights Chapter A5*. Rights and Social Choice Chapter A6. Reasoning and Social Decisions Notes Bibliography Subject Index Name Index

Can the values which individual members of society attach to different alternatives be aggregated into values for society as a whole, in a way that is both fair and theoretically sound? Is the majority principle a workable rule for making decisions? How should income inequality be measured? When and how can we compare the distribution of welfare in different societies?' So reads the 1998 Nobel citation by the Swedish Academy, acknowledging Amartya Sen's important contributions in welfare economics and particularly his work in Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Originally published in 1970, this classic study has been recognized for its groundbreaking role in integrating economics and ethics, and for its influence in opening up new areas of research in social choice, including aggregative assessment. It has also had a large influence on international organizations, including the United Nations, notably in its work on human development. The book showed that the 'impossibility theorems' in social choice theory--led by the pioneering work of Kenneth Arrow--do not negate the possibility of reasoned and democratic social choice. Sen's ideas about social choice, welfare economics, inequality, poverty, and human rights have continued to evolve since the book's first appearance. This expanded edition preserves the text of the original while presenting eleven new chapters of fresh arguments and results. Both the new and original chapters alternate between nonmathematical treatments of Sen's subjects, accessible to all, and mathematical arguments and proofs.