Independence-Friendly Logic : A Game-Theoretic Approach / Allen L. Mann, Gabriel Sandu, Merlijn Sevenster.
Material type:
TextSeries: London Mathematical Society Lecture Note Series ; no. 386Publisher: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2011Description: 1 online resource (216 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9780511981418 (ebook)Subject(s): First-order logic | Game theoryAdditional physical formats: Print version: : No titleDDC classification: n/a LOC classification: BC128 | .M36 2011Online resources: Click here to access online Summary: Bringing together over twenty years of research, this book gives a complete overview of independence-friendly logic. It emphasizes the game-theoretical approach to logic, according to which logical concepts such as truth and falsity are best understood via the notion of semantic games. The book pushes the paradigm of game-theoretical semantics further than the current literature by showing how mixed strategies and equilibria can be used to analyze independence-friendly formulas on finite models. The book is suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates who have taken a course on first-order logic. It contains a primer of the necessary background in game theory, numerous examples and full proofs.
E-BOOKS
| Current library | Home library | Call number | Materials specified | URL | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMSc Library | IMSc Library | Link to resource | Available | EBK12117 |
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 16 Oct 2015).
Bringing together over twenty years of research, this book gives a complete overview of independence-friendly logic. It emphasizes the game-theoretical approach to logic, according to which logical concepts such as truth and falsity are best understood via the notion of semantic games. The book pushes the paradigm of game-theoretical semantics further than the current literature by showing how mixed strategies and equilibria can be used to analyze independence-friendly formulas on finite models. The book is suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates who have taken a course on first-order logic. It contains a primer of the necessary background in game theory, numerous examples and full proofs.
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