000			03526 a2200217 4500
008			241227b2017 |||||||| |||| 001 e eng d
020			_a9780141982502 (PB)
041			_aeng
080			_a330.341:303.5 _bSEN
100			_aSen, Amartya
245			_aCollective choice and social welfare
260			_bPenguin _c2017 _aUK
300			_axxxvii, 602p.
504			_aIncludes bibliography(p. 491 - 566) and notes
505			_a Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 1*. Preference Relations Chapter 2. Unanimity Chapter 2*. Collective Choice Rules and Pareto Comparisons Chapter 3. Collective Rationality Chapter 3*. Social Welfare Functions Chapter 4. Choice Versus Orderings Chapter 4*. Social Decision Functions Chapter 5. Values and Choice Chapter 5*. Anonymity, Neutrality and Responsiveness Chapter 6. Conflicts and Dilemmas Chapter 6*. The Liberal Paradox Chapter 7. Interpersonal Aggregation and Comparability Chapter 7*. Aggregation Quasi-Orderings Chapter 8. Cardinality With or Without Comparability Chapter 8*. Bargains and Social Welfare Functions Chapter 9. Equity and Justice Chapter 9*. Impersonality and Collective Quasi-Orderings Chapter 10. Majority Choice and Related Systems Chapter 10*. Restricted Preferences and Rational Choice Chapter 11. Theory and Practice Collective Choice and Social Welfare (2017) Chapter A1. Enlightenment and Impossibility Chapter A1*. Social Preference Chapter A2. Rationality and Consistency Chapter A2*. Problems of Social Choice Chapter A3 Justice and Equity Chapter A3*. Social Welfare Evaluation Chapter A4. Democracy and Public Engagement Chapter A4*. Votes and Majorities Chapter A5. The Idea of Rights Chapter A5*. Rights and Social Choice Chapter A6. Reasoning and Social Decisions Notes Bibliography Subject Index Name Index
520			_aCan the values which individual members of society attach to different alternatives be aggregated into values for society as a whole, in a way that is both fair and theoretically sound? Is the majority principle a workable rule for making decisions? How should income inequality be measured? When and how can we compare the distribution of welfare in different societies?' So reads the 1998 Nobel citation by the Swedish Academy, acknowledging Amartya Sen's important contributions in welfare economics and particularly his work in Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Originally published in 1970, this classic study has been recognized for its groundbreaking role in integrating economics and ethics, and for its influence in opening up new areas of research in social choice, including aggregative assessment. It has also had a large influence on international organizations, including the United Nations, notably in its work on human development. The book showed that the 'impossibility theorems' in social choice theory--led by the pioneering work of Kenneth Arrow--do not negate the possibility of reasoned and democratic social choice. Sen's ideas about social choice, welfare economics, inequality, poverty, and human rights have continued to evolve since the book's first appearance. This expanded edition preserves the text of the original while presenting eleven new chapters of fresh arguments and results. Both the new and original chapters alternate between nonmathematical treatments of Sen's subjects, accessible to all, and mathematical arguments and proofs.
650			_aWelfare economics _vecocnomic theory
650			_aSocial choice
690			_aGeneral
942			_cBK
999			_c60645 _d60645