000 04440nam a22006015i 4500
001 978-3-540-39871-4
003 DE-He213
005 20160624101946.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 121227s2004 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783540398714
_9978-3-540-39871-4
024 7 _a10.1007/b94819
_2doi
050 4 _aQA76.9.A25
072 7 _aURY
_2bicssc
072 7 _aCOM053000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a005.82
_223
245 1 0 _aSecurity Protocols
_h[electronic resource] :
_b10th International Workshop, Cambridge, UK, April 17-19, 2002. Revised Papers /
_cedited by Bruce Christianson, Bruno Crispo, James A. Malcolm, Michael Roe.
260 1 _aBerlin, Heidelberg :
_bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg,
_c2004.
264 1 _aBerlin, Heidelberg :
_bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg,
_c2004.
300 _aVIII, 248 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aLecture Notes in Computer Science,
_x0302-9743 ;
_v2845
505 0 _a(Transcript) -- Keynote Address -- Weak Authentication: How to Authenticate Unknown Principals without Trusted Parties -- Is Entity Authentication Necessary? -- A Structured Operational Modelling of the Dolev-Yao Threat Model -- On Trust Establishment in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks -- Legally Authorized and Unauthorized Digital Evidence -- Shrink-Wrapped Optimism: The DODA Approach to Distributed Document Processing -- Contractual Access Control -- Confidentiality Levels and Deliberate/Indeliberate Protocol Attacks -- Analyzing Delegation Properties -- Combinatorial Optimization of Countermeasures against Illegal Copying -- Protocols with Certified-Transfer Servers -- An Architecture for an Adaptive Intrusion-Tolerant Server -- Supporting Imprecise Delegation in KeyNote -- Modeling Protocols for Secure Group Communications in Ad Hoc Networks -- Delegation of Signalling Rights -- Mobile IPv6 Security -- Concluding Discussion: Accounting for Resources -- Back to the Beginning.
520 _aOnce again we bring you the proceedings of the International Workshop on Security Protocols. It seems hard to believe that we have reached the tenth event in this annual series. This year our theme was “Discerning the Protocol Participants.” Security protocols are usually described in terms of the active participants – Alice c- putes foo and sends it to Bob. However most security protocols also include o?-line participants, which are not synchronously involved in the exchange of messages: a bank may participate on behalf of a customer, and an arbiter may subsequently be asked to interpret the meaning of a run. These silent partners to the protocol have their own security policies, and assumptionsaboutidentity,authorizationandcapabilityneedtobere-examined when the agenda of a hidden participant may change. We hope that the position papers published here, which have been rewritten and rethought in the light of the discussions at the workshop, will be of interest, not just for the speci?c contributions they make but also for the deeper issues which they expose. In order to identify these issues more clearly, we include transcripts for some of the discussions which took place in Cambridge during the workshop. What would you have liked to add? Do let us know.
650 0 _aComputer science.
650 0 _aComputer Communication Networks.
650 0 _aOperating systems (Computers).
650 0 _aData encryption (Computer science).
650 0 _aComputer software.
650 0 _aInformation Systems.
650 1 4 _aComputer Science.
650 2 4 _aData Encryption.
650 2 4 _aComputer Communication Networks.
650 2 4 _aOperating Systems.
650 2 4 _aAlgorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity.
650 2 4 _aComputers and Society.
650 2 4 _aManagement of Computing and Information Systems.
700 1 _aChristianson, Bruce.
_eeditor.
700 1 _aCrispo, Bruno.
_eeditor.
700 1 _aMalcolm, James A.
_eeditor.
700 1 _aRoe, Michael.
_eeditor.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783540208303
786 _dSpringer
830 0 _aLecture Notes in Computer Science,
_x0302-9743 ;
_v2845
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/b94819
942 _2EBK4745
_cEBK
999 _c34039
_d34039