TY  - BOOK
AU  - Pomerance,Carl
ED  - SpringerLink (Online service)
TI  - Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’87: Proceedings 
T2  - Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
SN  - 9783540481843
AV  - QA76.9.A25 
U1  - 005.82 23
PY  - 1988///
CY  - Berlin, Heidelberg
PB  - Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Imprint: Springer
KW  - Computer science
KW  - Data encryption (Computer science)
KW  - Computer Science
KW  - Data Encryption
N1  - Communication Networks and Standards -- Standards for Data Security — a Change of Direction -- Integrating Cryptography in ISDN -- Protocols -- Special Uses and Abuses of the Fiat-Shamir Passport Protocol (extended abstract) -- Direct Minimum-Knowledge Computations (Extended Abstract) -- Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems -- How to Solve any Protocol Problem - An Efficiency Improvement (Extended Abstract) -- Multiparty Computations Ensuring Privacy of Each Party’s Input and Correctness of the Result -- Society and Group Oriented Cryptography: a New Concept -- A Simple and Secure Way to Show the Validity of Your Public Key -- Cryptographic Computation: Secure Fault-Tolerant Protocols and the Public-Key Model (Extended Abstract) -- Gradual and Verifiable Release of a Secret (Extended Abstract) -- Strong Practical Protocols -- Key Distribution Systems -- Identity-based conference key distribution systems -- On the KEY PREDISTRIBUTION SYSTEM: A Practical Solution to the Key Distribution Problem -- Key Distribution Systems Based on Identification Information -- Secret Distribution of Keys for Public-Key Systems -- Public Key Systems -- An Impersonation-Proof Identity Verification Scheme -- Arbitration in Tamper Proof Systems -- Efficient Digital Public-Key Signatures with Shadow -- Security-Related Comments Regarding McEliece’s Public-Key Cryptosystem -- Design and Analysis of Cryptographic Systems -- Components and Cycles of a Random Function -- Fast Spectral Tests for Measuring Nonrandomness and the DES -- Other Cycling Tests for DES -- A Crypto-Engine -- A Natural Taxonomy for Digital Information Authentication Schemes -- Analyzing Encryption Protocols Using Formal Verification Techniques (Extended Abstract) -- Cryptosystems based on an analog of heat flow -- A Combinatorial Approach to Threshold Schemes -- A Realization Scheme for the Identity-Based Cryptosystem -- Equivalence Between Two Flavours of Oblivious Transfers -- A construction for authentication / secrecy codes from certain combinatorial designs -- Applications -- A Digital Signature Based on a Conventional Encryption Function -- How to Make Replicated Data Secure -- A Study of Password Security -- A Video Scrambling Technique Based On Space Filling Curves (Extended Abstract) -- Secure Audio Teleconference -- Informal Contributions -- Attack on the Koyama-Ohta Identity Based Key Distribution Scheme -- On the F-function of FEAL -- Patterns of Entropy Drop of the Key in an S-Box of the DES (Extended Abtract) -- The Rao-Nam Scheme is Insecure Against a Chosen-Plaintext Attack -- On Struik-Tilburg Cryptanalysis of Rao-Nam Scheme -- A Generalization of Hellman’s Extension of Shannon’s Approach to Cryptography (Abstract) -- Multiparty Unconditionally Secure Protocols (Abstract)
N2  - Zero-knowledge interactive proofsystems are a new technique which can be used as a cryptographic tool for designing provably secure protocols. Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff originally suggested this technique for controlling the knowledge released in an interactive proof of membership in a language, and for classification of languages [19]. In this approach, knowledge is defined in terms of complexity to convey knowledge if it gives a computational advantage to the receiver, theory, and a message is said for example by giving him the result of an intractable computation. The formal model of interacting machines is described in [19, 15, 171. A proof-system (for a language L) is an interactive protocol by which one user, the prover, attempts to convince another user, the verifier, that a given input x is in L. We assume that the verifier is a probabilistic machine which is limited to expected polynomial-time computation, while the prover is an unlimited probabilistic machine. (In cryptographic applications the prover has some trapdoor information, or knows the cleartext of a publicly known ciphertext) A correct proof-system must have the following properties: If XE L, the prover will convince the verifier to accept the pmf with very high probability. If XP L no prover, no matter what program it follows, is able to convince the verifier to accept the proof, except with vanishingly small probability
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48184-2
ER  -